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I. Introduction
The Republic of Ivory Coast used to be the fourth-largest economy in Sub-Saharan
Africa until the failed military coup attempt in 2002.' Since then the country has been split
into two parts. The government controls the southern half, while rebellion groups have
taken over the north, which is rich in diamond mines.' The diamonds originating from
those mines are called "conflict" or "blood" diamonds because the rebellion forces use the
revenues from the diamond sales to purchase arms, which halts peace-making efforts in
the country.' In 2004, the United Nations Security Council imposed a ban on imports of
diamonds from Ivory Coast and renewed that ban in December 2005. 4
Ivory Coast is a participant in the Kimberley Process, a forum in which participating
countries have designed an international certification scheme for rough diamonds known
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1. See CIA-The World Factbook, Cote d'Ivoire, (Aug. 22, 2006), http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/
factbook/geos/iv.html (stating that Ivory Coast was among "the most prosperous... tropical African states"
and that rebels took control over the northern half of the country after dissidents "launched a failed coup
attempt in September 2002"); see also Lansana Gberie, The Crisis in Ivory Coast (June 24, 2004), http://www.
globalpolicy.org/security/issues/ivory/2004/0624analyze.htm.
2. See Gberie, svpra note 1.
3. See GLOBAL WITNESS, MAKING IT WORK: WHY THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS MUST Do MORE TO STOP CON-
FLICT DIAMONDS (2005) [hereinafter MAKING IT WORK], available at www.globalwimess.org/reports/show.php/
en.00082.htm; see also United Nations Dep't of Public Info., Conflict Diamonds: Sanctions and War, Mar. 21,
2001, available at http://www.un.org/peace/africa/Diamond.html (defining conflict diamonds).
4. See S.C. Res. 1643, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1643 (Dec. 15, 2005), available at http://www.un.org/docs/sc/unsc-
resolutions05.htm (follow "S/RES/1643 (2005)" hyperlink); S.C. Res. 1572, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1572 (Nov. 15,
2004), available at http://www.un.org/ Docs/sc/unsc-resolutionsO4.html (follow "Security Council Resolution
1572 (2004)" hyperlink).
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as the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS)5 The KPCS aims to halt the illegal
trade in conflict diamonds. The certification scheme allows trade in diamonds only between
participating countries with the presence of a valid Kimberley certificate and forbids their
importation and exportation from non-participants. Nevertheless, conflict diamonds con-
tinue to be smuggled from the northern part of Ivory Coast into the neighboring countries
of Guinea and Mali, and then reach markets in developed countries.6 The United States
remains "the world's largest diamond jewelry market," while Belgium and the United King-
dom are the major centers for the importation and exportation of rough diamonds.7 The
continuing trade in illegal diamonds from Ivory Coast raises questions about the efficiency
of the KPCS.
This article analyzes the implementation and effectiveness of the KPCS in the United
States in a comparative perspective. Part I examines the origins and goals of the KPCS and
the request for the World Trade Organization (WTO) waiver to allow KPCS participants
to take the necessary measures to regulate the importation and exportation of conflict dia-
monds. Part I further presents the implementation of the KPCS in the United States and
Belgium. Part II analyzes the effectiveness of the KPCS in the United States. It focuses on
its limitations, the compilation of inconsistent statistics, and the lack of sufficient border
control and verification in the United States. Part II also discusses the forthcoming expira-
tion of the WTO waiver. Then, Part HI recommends how to reform the KPCS and make
it more efficient in the United States. Finally, the article concludes that the United States
could learn from the implementation of the KPCS in Belgium.
II. The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme
and Its Implementation
This background section explains how the Kimberley Process and its certification scheme
came into existence. This section also describes the approval of the WVTO waiver and the
implementation of the KPCS in the United States and Belgium.
A. THE ORIGINS OF THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS CERTIFICATION SCHEME
The KPCS is "a joint government, international diamond industry, and civil society ini-
tiative" to stop the trade in illegal diamonds that has contributed to military conflicts in
countries such as Ivory Coast.' The idea to create the KPCS originated in May 2000, when
South Africa and other African diamond producing countries met in Kimberley, South
Africa, to stop the trade in conflict diamonds that contributes to violent conflicts, terrorist
5. See Kimberley Process, Background, http://www.kimberleyprocess.com:8080/site/?name=background
(last visited May 3, 2006) [hereinafter Background].
6. See Kimberley Process, Summary of the Kimberley ProcessReview Visit to Guinea, Apr. 23-28, 2005, available
at http://www.kdmberleyprocess.com:8080/site/www -docs/press/summary-reprt-guinea.pdf (discussing
the implementation of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme in Guinea).
7. See Nw. Territories, Diamond Facts 2004/05, http://www.iti.gov.nt.ca/diamond/industry.hm#polishbel
(last visited May 4, 2006) (providing statistics about diamond production and sales worldwide); see also
Diamond-Key, Centers and Bourses, May 25, 2000, htp://www.diamond-key.com/bourses (stating that rough
diamonds are mined across four continents and are sorted in London and then distributed to the cutting cen-
ters around the world).
8. See Kimberley Process, The Kimberley Process, Jan. 1, 2006, available at http://www.kimberleyprocess.
com:8080/site/?name=home (describing the origins of the Kimberley Process).
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activities, and human rights abusesY On December 1, 2000, the United Nations General
Assembly adopted a resolution to create an international certification process to prevent
the illicit trade in rough diamonds that finances armed conflicts.'0 United Nations Security
Council Resolutions 1173 (1998), 1295 (2000), 1306 (2000), and 1343 (2001) supported the
implementation of the KPCS." The Interlaken Declaration of November 2002 launched
the KPCS, as a solution to the international problem of conflict diamonds. 2 The certifica-
tion scheme currently has forty-five participants, representing around ninety percent of the
world's diamond trade. 3 Each participant has to implement the KPCS and exchange ideas
with the other participants during the annual plenary meetings.'
4
The aim of the KPCS is to prevent the trade in conflict diamonds while helping to
protect the legitimate trade in rough diamonds. KPCS's Preamble recognizes that trade
in conflict diamonds is a "matter of serious international concern" and is linked to the
"fuelling of armed conflict," and "proliferation of armaments." The Definitions Section
defines conflict diamonds as only rough diamonds and not polished diamonds, or diamonds
transformed into jewelry. 6 A country of origin is defined as "the country where a ship-
ment of rough diamonds has been mined or extracted;" a country of provenance is "the
last [p]articipant from where a shipment of rough diamonds was exported, as recorded on
import documentation;" a parcel of mixed origin is a "parcel that contains rough diamonds
from two or more countries of origin, mixed together;" and a Kimberley Process certificate
is "a forgery resistant document with a particular format which identifies a shipment of
rough diamonds as being in compliance with the... Certification Scheme." 7
The goal of the certification scheme is to exclude conflict diamonds from legitimate
trade." It allows participating countries to trade among themselves in non-conflict diamonds
and prohibits participants from importing or exporting diamonds from non-participants. 19
The KPCS requires governments of participating countries to implement systems of con-
trol to ensure that imported and exported diamonds are not conflict diamonds. Each coun-
try decides what system to put into place to certify that it is exporting and importing only
"conflict-free" diamonds from other participating countries. Participation in the KPCS is
open to all countries that are "willing and able to fulfill [its] requirements."20
9. See Background, supra note 5 (providing information on the goals of the Kimberley Process Certifica-
tion Scheme).
10. See Conflict Diamonds: Sanctions and War, supra note 3 (stating that the United Nations General Assembly
unanimously adopted Resolution A/RES/55/56 of December 1, 2000).
11. Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, Nov. 5, 2002, pmbl., http://www.kimberleyprocess.com:8080
(follow "Enter Public Area" hyperlink, then follow "KPCS" hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 11, 2007).
12. See id. at sec. 6.
13. See Kimberley Process, List of Participants, available at http:// www.kimberleyprocess.com:8080 (follow
"Enter Public Area" hyperlink, then follow "List of Participants" hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 11, 2007) (listing
the countries that presently participate in the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme).
14. See Kimberley Process, Rules of Procedure of Meetings of the Plenary, and Its Ad Hoc Working Groups
and Subsidiary Bodies, available at http:// www.ldmberleyprocess.com:8080 (follow "Enter Public Area" hyper-
link, then follow "Kimberley Structure" hyperlink, then follow "Kimberley Process Rules of Procedure"
hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 11, 2007) (listing the rules of procedure of meetings of the plenary).
15. See Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, supra note 11, pmbl.
16. Id. § I.
17. Id.
18. Id. §§ H1, III.
19. Id.
20. Id. § VI.
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The KPCS has developed a set of minimum requirements that each participant is
required to implement.2 A "duly validated" Kimberley Process certificate must accompany
each shipment of rough diamonds on import and export, and a confirmation of receipt con-
taining the certificate number, the number of parcels, the carat weight, and the details of
the importer and exporter, should be sent to the relevant exporting authority. Participating
countries are not allowed to import or export shipments from non-participants.22
Each participant also must "establish a system of internal controls ... to eliminate the
presence of conflict diamonds from shipments of rough diamonds imported into and
exported from its territory."23 Participants should "designate an [i]mporting and [e]xporting
[a]uthority," and "ensure that... diamonds are imported and exported in tamper resistant
containers," and also must collect and maintain import and export statistics, and exchange
such data with other participants. 4 Finally, each participant is required to amend and "enact
the appropriate laws and regulations to implement and enforce" the KPCS.25 The KPCS
does not provide for uniform civil and criminal penalties for violators of its provisions.2 6
The KPCS requires that each certificate bear the title of Kimberley Process Certifi-
cate and a statement that "[t]he rough diamonds in this shipment have been handled in
accordance with the provisions of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for rough
diamonds." Each certificate ought to be tamper- and forgery-resistant, contain the coun-
try of origin for shipment of parcels from a single origin, as well as a unique number, the
dates of issuance and expiry, and the issuing authority. Each certificate also must identify
the importer and exporter, the carat weight, the value of the diamonds in U.S. dollars, the
number of parcels in the shipment, the relevant Harmonized Commodity Description and
Coding System, and a validation of the certificate by the exporting authority.2"
The KPCS recommends that the exporter "submit a rough diamond shipment to the
relevant Exporting Authority."29 The exporting authority should validate a Kimberley cer-
tificate after the exporter has presented a declaration that the exported diamonds are not
conflict diamonds and should transmit an electronic message to the importing authority
with information including the weight, value, country of origin or provenance, importer,
and serial numbers of the diamonds.3" The importing authority should subsequently open
and inspect the shipment to verify the seals and to ensure that the exports comply with the
KPCS requirements and match the details declared on the Certificate.3
The KPCS strongly encourages the collection of reliable and comparable data on the
production and trade in conflict diamonds. 2 Participants are encouraged to maintain data
on the exportation and importation of diamonds, by origin, provenance, carat weight,
and value, under the relevant Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System
21. Id. §§ 11, 1ll.
22. Id.§ Ill.
23. Id. § IV(a).
24. Id. § IV(b), (c).
25. Id. § IV(d).
26. See id. § W
27. Id. Annex I(A).
28. Id.
29. Id. Annex 11(17).
30. Id. Annex 11(18), (19), (22).
31. Id. Annex 11(23).
32. See id. Annex M.
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subheadings 7102.10, 7102.21, and 7102.31.33 The participating countries are expected to
keep and publish the data semi-annually.1
4
Fearing that the certification scheme could violate provisions of the World Trade
Organization's General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),35 KPCS participants
requested a waiver for import and export restrictions on conflict diamonds and the WTO
granted it.
B. THE WAIVER FROM THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
A request for a WTO waiver is a special procedure reserved for exceptional circum-
stances in which a member presents justifiable reasons to temporarily suspend specific
WTO obligations. Articles IX:3 and IX:4 of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization (WTO Agreement)36 provide for the possibility of obtaining a waiver from
the "/TO obligations in question. A WTO member has to submit a request to the Coun-
cil for Trade in Goods for a decision-making by consensus. If the Council for Trade in
Goods is not able to reach consensus within a period of ninety days, then a decision to
grant waiver should be taken by a three-fourths majority. The decision to grant waiver
should state the exceptional circumstances that justify the decision and the date on which
it terminates.
At the end of the period the Council for Trade in Goods must submit a report to the
Ministerial Conference. A waiver is reviewed annually until its termination. The Ministe-
rial Conference, on the basis of the annual review, might extend, modify, or terminate the
waiver. Waivers may be granted to individual countries or to a group of countries.
On November 22, 2002, CanadaJapan, and Sierra Leone filed a request for a WTO waiv-
er to allow them to take the necessary measures to regulate the importation and exportation
of conflict diamonds according to the KPCS.37 The request sought to institute a waiver
from the provisions of most-favored nation treatment (GATE Article I: 1),11 elimination of
quantitative restrictions (GATT Article XI:1),39 and non-discriminatory administration of
33. Id. Annex III(b).
34. Id. Annex 11(c).
35. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947,61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.TS. 194 [hereinafter
GATT; Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1144,1867 U.N.TS.
154 [hereinafter GATT 1994] (GATT 1994 did not replace GATT 1947, and both are read together).
36. See GATT 1994, supra note 35.
37. See Communication of Canada, Japan, & Sierra Leone, Kimberley Process Certification Scee for Rough
Diamonds-Request for a WPT0 Waiver, G/C/W/431 (Nov. 12, 2002).
38. GATT, supra note 35, art. 1:1 (states in relevant part:
With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with importation or
exportation or imposed on the international transfer of payments for imports and exports, and with respect to
the method of levying such duties and charges, and with respect to all rules and formalities in connection with
importation and exportation..., any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting
party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and uncon-
ditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.).
39. Id. art. X1I (states in pertinent part:
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made effective through
quotas, import or export licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting party
on the importation of any product of the territory of any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale
for export of any product destined for the territory of any other contracting party.).
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quantitative restrictions (GATT Article XIII: 1)4 betweenJanuary 1,2003, and December 31,
2006. The Philippines, Thailand, and the United Arab Emirates became part of the waiver
request on November 21, 2002.4' Australia, Brazil, Israel, and the United States joined
the request for a waiver on January 14, 2003.42 Countries that opposed the WTO waiver
considered that GAT Article XXI (Security Exemptions) 4 or GATT Article XX (General
Exceptions)44 cover issues such as the KPCS.
On February 26, 2003, the WTO Council for Trade in Goods approved the request
for a waiver for trade measures under the KPCS.4 ' The WTO Council for Trade in
Goods recognized that the trade in conflict diamonds is a matter of serious international
concern,4 noting its devastating impact, and noting that the United Nations Security
Council Resolution S/RES/1459 (2003) supported the waiver.47 The waiver exempts
the countries that requested it, and others that subsequently join, from GAIT provi-
sions on most-favored nation treatment (GATT Article 1: 1), elimination of quantitative
restrictions (GAT Article XI:), and non-discriminatory administration of quantita-
tive restrictions (GATT Article XIII:1) from January 1, 2003, through December 31,
2006.41
40. Id. art. XIII: I (states in relevant part:
No prohibition or restriction shall be applied by any contracting party on the importation of any product of
the territory of any other contracting party or on the exportation of any product destined for the territory of
any other contracting party, unless the importation of the like product of all third countries or the exportation
of the like product to all third countries is similarly prohibited or restricted.).
41. See Communication from Canada, Japan, and Sierra Leone, Corrigendum, Kimberley Process Certification
Scheme for Rough Diamonds-Request for a HITO Waiver, G/C/W/43 I/Corr. 1 (Nov. 21, 2002).
42. See Communication from Canada, Japan, and Sierra Leone, Corrigendum, Kimberley Process Certification
Scheme for Rough Diamonds-Request for a WTO Waiver, G/C/W/43 l/Corr.2 (Jan. 14, 2003).
43. GATF, supra note 35, art. XXI (states in relevant part:
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed (a) to require any contracting party to furnish any informa-
tion the disclosure of which it considers contrary to its essential security interests; or (b) to prevent any con-
tracting party from taking any action which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security
interests.... (ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to such traffic in other
goods and materials as is carried on directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying a military establishment;
(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations; or (c) to prevent any contracting party
from taking any action in pursuance of its obligations under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance
of international peace and security.).
44. Id. art. XX (states in relevant part:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means
of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised
restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or
enforcement by any contracting party or measures: (a) necessary to protect public morals; (b) necessary to
protect human, animal or plant life or health.).
45. See Communication from Australia, Brazil, Canada, Israel, Japan, Korea, Philippines, Sierra Leone,
Thailand, United Arab Emirates, and United States, Waiver Concerning Kimberley Process Certification Scheme
for Rough Diamonds, G/C/W/432/Rev.1 (Feb. 24, 2003) [hereinafter WTO Approved Waiver]; see also Press
Release, WTO News, Agreement Reached on WTO Waiver for "Conflict Diamonds," (Feb. 26, 2003)
available at http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/news03_e/goods-council_26fev03_e.htm (describing the
waiver request and decision, and noting that WTO members could join the waiver decision even after it was
adopted).
46. WTO Approved Waiver, supra note 45.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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C. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS CERTIFICATION
SCHEME IN THE UNITED STATES
The Clean Diamond Trade Act of 2003 implements the KPCS in the United States.49
Section 2 of the Act introduces facts that demonstrate the deaths caused by trade in conflict
diamonds, stating that around 3.7 million people have died in Africa as a result of wars
funded from the sale of conflict diamonds.50 Section 3 introduces the main terms used in the
Act, defining a rough diamond as a "diamond that is unworked or simply sawn, cleaved, or
bruted and classifiable under subheading 7102.10, 7102.21, or 7102.31 of the Harmonized
Tariff Schedule of the United States.""' Unlike the KPCS, this section fails to define the
terms "country of origin" and "country of provenance," and also does not define the term
"polished diamonds." 2
Section 4 of the Clean Diamond Trade Act states that the President of the United States
must prohibit the importation into or the exportation out of the United States of any rough
diamonds that are not controlled by the KPCS and also requires an annual review of the
standards, practices, and procedures of any entity in the United States that issues Kimber-
ley certificates." Section 6 specifies the importing and exporting authorities in the United
States as the U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the U.S. Cen-
sus Bureau, respectively. The Act establishes a coordination committee, which includes
the Department of Treasury, the State Department, the Commerce Department, the U.S.
Trade Representative, and the Department of Homeland Security.
4
Section 8 explains civil and criminal penalties, providing that any person who violates or
attempts to violate the Act may be subject to a civil penalty not exceeding $10,000." Any
person who willfully violates or attempts to violate provisions under this Act upon convic-
tion may be fined not more than $50,000.56 The executive branch must keep and publish
statistics on the imports and exports of rough diamonds, and make them available to inter-
ested parties."1 The President is required to issue annual and semi-annual reports contain-
ing statistical information on the importation and exportation of rough diamonds.5"
The U.S. Kimberley Process Authority (USKPA) is the issuing authority for rough
diamond export certificates in the United States. 9 Rough diamonds exported from the
United States need to have a U.S. Kimberley Process Certificate issued by the USKPA.
Each certificate is assigned a unique number by the Automated Export System (AES) of the
49. See Clean Diamond Trade Act, Pub. L. No. 108-19, § 3901, 117 Stat. 631 (2003) (former Congressman
Amory Houghton (R-New York) introduced H.R. 1584, which was passed by both houses and signed by the
President into law on April 25, 2003). See generally NICOLAS COOK, DIAMONDS AND CONFLICT: BACKGROUND,
POLICY, AND LEGISLATION (2003) (providing information about the implementation of the Kimberley Process
Certification Scheme in the United States).
50. Clean Diamond Trade Act, supra note 49, § 2.
51. Id.§3.
52. Id.
53. Id. §§ 4,5.
54. Id.§ 11.
55. Id. § 8(a)(1).
56. Id. § 8(a)(2).
57. Id. § 10(b).
58. Id. § 12.
59. See Automated Export System Mandatory Filing for Export (Reexports) of Rough Diamonds, 68 Fed.
Reg. 59,877 (Oct. 20, 2003) (to be codified at 15 C.FR. pt. 300).
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U.S. Census Bureau. 60 Companies have to register with CBP to obtain such a number. An
internal transaction number (ITN) is issued automatically with an AES number.61 USKPA
licensees must report monthly to the USKPA, which informs the State Department and the
Census Bureau of the use of the certificates and the destination of each shipment.
D. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS CERTIFICATION
SCHEME IN BELGIUM
Belgium is a member of the European Union (EU), which is a KPCS member.62 The
EU has implemented the KPCS through Council Regulation No. 2368.63 The Council
Regulation is binding and directly applicable to all EU Member States such as Belgium.
Article 2 of the Resolution defines a "Community authority" as the authority designated
by an EU Member State to use, validate, or verify Kimberley certificates. 6 So far, four EU
Member States have designated Community authorities. 65 Those states are Belgium, the
Czech Republic, Germany, and the United Kingdom.6 A certificate has to be "duly issued
and validated by a participant's competent authority identifying a shipment of rough dia-
monds." 67 The Council Regulation prohibits the importation of rough diamonds in the EU
that are not accompanied by a valid certificate and are not in tamper-resistant containers
with an export seal. 6 All containers and certificates are subject to verification. 69 Commu-
nity authorities must provide the European Commission with a monthly report describing
all the certificates submitted for verification.7" As the EU representative to the KPCS, the
EU Commission ensures compliance with the provisions of the Council Regulation imple-
menting the KPCS.71
Additionally, the Council Regulation prohibits the exportation of rough diamonds unless
the rough diamonds are in a tamper-resistant container and are accompanied by a certificate
issued and validated by a Community authority.72 The Community authority may issue an
export certificate if the exporter has provided conclusive evidence that the rough diamonds
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme refers to European Communities. In this article, I use the
term European Union in lieu of European Communities.
63. See Council Regulation 2368/2002, 2002 J.O. (358) 28 [hereinafter EU Council Regulation of 2002],
available at http://www.europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/ 1358A358/1 _35820021231 en00280048.pdf.
64. See id. art. 2.
65. Europa, Helpful Addresses: Community Authorities (acting as Kimberley Process Authorities in the
EC), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/extemal-relations/kimb/intro/address.htm (listing the contact
information for the community authorities).
66. See Commission Regulation 762/2003, 2003 J.O. (109) 10; Commission Regulation 1214/2003, 2003
J.O. (169) 30; see also Europa, Helpful Addresses: Community Authorities (acting as Kimberley Process
Authorities in the EC), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/externalrelations/kimb/intro/address.hun
(listing the contact information for the community authorities).
67. See EU Council Regulation of 2002, supra note 63.
68. Id. art. 3.
69. Id. art. 4.
70. Id. art. 10.
71. See Europa, Implementing the KPCS Inside the EC/EU, http://europa.eu.int/comm/ externalrelations/
kimb/intro/implement.htm (last visited May 4, 2006).
72. EU Council Regulation of 2002, supra note 63, art. 11.
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are transported in a tamper-resistant container and were lawfully imported and destined to
the territory of a participant.73 A Community authority cannot validate a certificate until
it verifies the contents of the containers by opening each of them or by risk analysis, or
another similar system.74 There is a uniform EU tamper-resistant certificate that is used by
each of the above-mentioned Community authorities.75 A shipment may arrive at any EU
port of entry, but if the EU Member State has not been designated a Community authority,
the shipment will go to a country that is a Community authority.7 6 Verification is suspended
until arrival at a Community authority.77
Belgium is the largest center for diamond trade in the entire world.7" The Belgian city
of Antwerp is known as the diamond capital of the world.79 More than 85 percent of all the
rough diamonds in the world pass through Antwerp."° More than 50 percent of the world's
production of rough, polished, and industrial diamonds enters Antwerp.," Additionally,
more than 99 percent of all imported diamonds are exported again from Antwerp to other
countries.8 2 Antwerp has four diamond exchanges and 1500 diamond companies. 3
The Belgian Federal Public Service Economy (FPSE)14 administers a licensing system
for the import and export of diamonds.8" FPSE collects data about the qualifications, coun-
try of origin, country of provenance, weight, and value of the imported and exported dia-
monds.8 6 An import or export license is required for every shipment of diamonds from or
to non-EU countries. 7 All diamond dealers must be officially recognized and registered by
the FPSE.ss All diamonds imported into and exported from Belgium must be inspected by
the Diamond Office in Antwerp. 9 The Diamond Office is the customs office for diamonds
and is operated by the Diamond High Counsel9° in collaboration with the FPSE. The Dia-
mond Office oversees whether diamonds exported from Belgium are correctly appraised
according to their invoice. Its seven customs officers check the diamonds, the bills of lading,
73. Id. art. 12.
74. Id.
75. Implementing the KPCS Inside the EC/EU, supra note 71.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See DIAMOND HIGH COUNCIL, PROGRESS REPORT, http://www.conflictdiamonds.com/pages/Interface/
reportframe.htrl (last visited on Mar. 17, 2006) (presenting the general positioning of the Belgian diamond
market).




82. See DIAMOND HIGH COUNCIL, supra note 78 (follow "Belgian Diamond Market" hyperlink).
83. Id.
84. See Federal Public Service Economy, available at http://mineco.fgov.be/menu/new-en.asp (last visited
May 2, 2006).
85. See DIAMOND HIGH COUNCIL, supra note 78 (follow "Belgian Diamond Market" hyperlink); see also
GLOBAL WITNESS, THE KEY TO KIMBERLEY INTERNAL DIAMOND CONTROLS: SEVEN CASE STUDIES 12 (2004),
available at http://www.globalwitness.org [hereinafter THE KEY TO KIMBERLEY].
86. See THE KEY TO KIMBERLEY, supra note 85.
87. See id. (referring to the Royal Decree of October 23, 1987).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See HRD, HRD Structure, http://www.hrd.be/index.php?id= 12 (last visited May 2, 2006) (explaining
that the Diamond High Counsel is the coordinating body and official representative of the diamond industry
in Belgium and that it is the official liaison for the Belgian diamond sector with the government).
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the invoices, and the licenses.9 All diamond dealers have an obligation to file a declaration
with the FPSE.92 The Diamond Office publishes monthly statistics.93
Import licenses are required for imports of diamonds from Ivory Coast, Mali, and
Guinea.94 All rough diamonds entering and leaving Belgium have to be inspected by dia-
mond experts who are sworn in by the FPSE.95 These inspections are centralized in the
Diamond Office and performed under the supervision of the FPSE while customs officers
are present.9 6 Sworn experts and officials of the FPSE inspect the goods in detail if a gem-
ologist determines that they do not correspond to the mentioned origin.97 Customs officers
investigate if a country of origin that has no diamond production is listed.9 Customs offi-
cers also investigate cases of unknown origin, which includes mixtures of diamonds from
different origins.'
Ill. Analyzing the Effectiveness of the Kimberley Process
Certification Scheme
As currently implemented, the KPCS is nothing more than a voluntary agreement
between nations that lacks the strength necessary to compel uniform global compliance.
A. LIMITATIONS OF THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS CERTIFICATION SCHEME
The KPCS has no effect in non-participating countries. As a result, non-participants,
such as Mali, continue to serve as a gateway for conflict diamonds. Illicit diamonds from
Ivory Coast are smuggled into Mali and are exported illegally to participating countries.
KPCS participants that have adopted a weak implementation of the certification process,
such as Guinea, also serve as gateways for conflict diamonds. Conflict diamonds from Ivory
Coast are smuggled into Mali and Guinea, enter developed countries, and become sub-
stantially transformed into jewelry. The cutting and polishing of a diamond changes the
character of the outer surface of the gemstone and results in its substantial transforma-
tion. Further work or material added to an article effects a substantial transformation and,
when performed in a country other than the country of origin, renders the other country
the country of origin.' 0 Therefore, a rough diamond from Ivory Coast, once polished in
Belgium or the United States, has undergone substantial transformation and has become a
polished diamond from Belgium or the United States.
The narrow definition of conflict diamonds does not include polished stones and jewelry.
This adversely affects the overarching goals of the KPCS. Polished or cut diamonds are
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100. See Diamonds and Armed Conflict in Sierra Leone: Proposal for Implementation of a New Diamond Policy
and Operation (USAID, Working Paper 05-08-00, 2000), available at http://www.usaid.gov/hum-response/oti/
country/sleone/diamonds.html.
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diamonds. The certification scheme does not verify polished diamonds for country of origin
through a certification system and it does not verify diamonds that have been substantially
transformed into jewelry. Moreover, countries participating in the KPCS must establish
uniform internal controls. Despite these attempts at control, the certification system is too
vague in terms of internal controls. The KPCS does not specifically state what constitutes
an appropriate law or what action should be taken against violators. There is no guarantee
that a country's internal controls will prevent diamonds from being imported or exported
illegally.
Similarly, the Clean Diamond Trade Act does not specify that rough diamonds, when
exported from the country in which they were extracted, have to be sealed in a secure,
transparent container or bag by appropriate government officials of that country.01 The
Clean Diamond Trade Act does not state that jewelry containing diamonds could not be
imported into the United States unless the exporting country is a KPCS participant and has
implemented internal controls for the import and export of diamonds.' As a result, dia-
monds mined in Ivory Coast and cut in Belgium become products of Belgium for country
of origin marking purposes.
The CBP has concluded that a substantial transformation occurs when "an article
emerges from a process with a new name, character, or use different from that pos-
sessed by the article prior to processing."103 The cutting of a quality gem diamond by
cleaving or sawing to shape the stone and eliminating flaws is a process that requires
considerable skill and attention to detaili °4 This process significantly alters the shape
and appearance of a diamond, and enhances its value and uses. 05 The CBP has referred
to Treasury Decision 44370 from November 1930, which states that diamonds mined in
South Africa and cut in Holland were products of Holland for country of origin marking
purposes. 16
The CBP has also stated that diamonds that are cut, faceted, and polished in Thailand
undergo a substantial transformation. 0 7 The finished diamond is set into a ring.',0 The fin-
ished diamond and the ring are the finished products. 0 9 Moreover, the CBP has noted that
the cutting and polishing of a ruby performed in Austria had the effect of changing the char-
acter of the outer surface of the gemstone resulting in substantial transformation." 0 The
CBP has noted that further work or material added in another country effects a substantial
101. See Clean Diamond Trade Act, supra note 49.
102. See id.
103. See Michael Stem, CBP Ruling on Tariff Treatment Applicable to Jewelry Set With Stones in Costa
Rica, HQ 556457 (U.S. Customs & Border Patrol, Mar. 5, 1992) (citing Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States,
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Rubies from Austria, NY K 85866 (U.S. Customs & Border Patrol, May 14, 2004), available at http://rlings.
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transformation and renders such country the country of origin."' Therefore, the KPCS
participants need to address the principle of substantial transformation with respect to dia-
monds and increase the scope of the certification scheme to jewelry containing diamonds.
The inconsistent statistics in the United States are also problematic.
B. INCONSISTENT STATISTICS IN THE UNITED STATES
Trade statistics are crucial to detect indirect imports and smuggling of conflict diamonds.
Such information restricts instances of changing classification of diamonds. The Belgian
FPSE maintains a detailed national database on every import and export of diamonds,
and updates its statistics and reports monthly."' It compiles data about the classification,
weight, value, provenance, origin, and destination of diamonds."' These numbers are veri-
fied against the declarations submitted annually by diamond traders and manufacturers. " 4
The Clean Diamond Trade Act states that the President has the authority to ban the
import and export of diamonds that do not comply with the KPCS, but it does not go into
detail about how to keep the statistics." ' Statistics in the United States do not include the
country of origin of the diamonds. This is an obstacle to the monitoring of indirect trade in
conflict diamonds. The United States has not been consistent in reporting its statistics."5
For example, in 2003 the United States reported that it exported twice as many diamonds
than it imported." 7 In 2004, the United States reported that it exported only 46 percent
more diamonds than it imported.I'S Those discrepancies are significant because the United
States is not a diamond producing country and smuggling most likely occurred. In addition,
the United States has misclassified diamonds. CBP officials have classified polished dia-
monds as rough diamonds.' "9 Thus, statistical reports in the United States are inconsistent
and do not reflect the exact numbers of imports and exports of diamonds.
C. INSUFFICIENT BORDER CONTROL AND VERIFICATION
IN THE UNITED STATES
The KPCS as implemented in the United States does not require sufficient supervision
over exports and imports of conflict diamonds. The infrequent examination of diamond
111. See Gibson, Dunn, & Crutcher LLP, CBP Ruling on Country of Origin, Substantial Transformation,
Rough Rubies Mined in Burma, Heat Treatment, Cutting and Polishing, HQ 563127 (U.S. Customs & Border
Patrol, Dec. 15, 2004), available at http://rulings.cbp.gov/index.asp?.
112. See MYRIAM VANDER STYCHELE, CONFLICT DIAMONDS: CROSSING EUROPEAN BORDERS? A CASE STUY OF
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able at http://www.kimberleyprocess.com:8080/site/?name=documents (last visited Mar. 31, 2005) (follow
"Review Visit: USA Summary" hyperlink) (summarizing the deficiencies found in the implementation of the
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme in the United States) [hereinafter SUMMARY OF KPCS REvIEw].
117. See id.
118. Id.
119. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE: CRITICAL ISSUES REMAIN IN DETERRING
CONFLICT DIAMOND TRADE 18 (2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-02-678 (noting
that the inaccuracies in U.S. data make it harder for the United States to detect and deter conflict diamonds).
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parcels in the United States increases the chances of diamond smuggling and defeats the
purpose of the Clean Diamond Trade Act. It is vital that KPCS participants maintain con-
trols that track diamonds back from their point of export to the location in which they were
mined. 2°
The FPSE in Belgium checks all the relevant documents, including issued import and
export licenses and certificates of origin of diamonds coming from countries where conflict
diamonds originate. Export inspectors report irregularities to the FPSE, which launches an
investigation of the irregularities. 2' The FPSE is the only agency that can grant export and
import licenses in Belgium.
The Diamond Office in Antwerp is Belgium's only entry port for all diamonds. All dia-
monds are checked and cleared here before entering the territory of Belgium. The seven
customs officers at the Diamond Office complete the clearance formalities, verify the sup-
plied information, check the documents that accompany the parcels, and verify the actual
weight and value of the diamonds. Every parcel of diamonds is inspected. 122
The eleven certified experts are selected, appointed, and sworn by the FPSE after pass-
ing an exam.'23 Inspectors determine on a case-by-case basis whether a more thorough
inspection is necessary. A qualified gemologist is consulted if questions arise as to the
origin of the diamonds. The gemological department of the Diamond High Council has
put together an illustrated atlas describing the characteristics of diamonds from Africa and
methods to recognize them. The inspection takes place under the control of officials from
the FPSE. Those officials decide which expert will check the parcel and inspections are
videotaped.
The U.S. government issues the Kimberley certificates through the USKPA. Neither
the USKPA nor CBP, however, examines the exports physically, except on a random and
infrequent basis.' 24 Likewise, imports of rough diamonds are rarely checked by CBP and no
licenses are required for diamonds imported and exported to and from the United States.
Not every diamond parcel is inspected in the United States.'25 Enforcement measures are
selective and targeted. CBP does not check to see whether the diamonds come from the
stated country of origin, nor do they verify the authenticity of the certificates of origin.
They do not contact the authorities in Ivory Coast to verify the authenticity of the certifi-
cates. The KPCS only sets the minimum standards, and the United States should impose
more rigorous measures to carry out its mission.
D. THE ExPIRATION OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION WAIVER
The above-discussed VVTO waiver expires in December 2006, raising the issue of its
extension. The WTO waiver has both proponents and opponents. Opponents of the waiver
argue that GATT Articles XX and XXI allow VVTO member countries to take measures
to deal with situations like those presented by the current trade in conflict diamonds with-
out violating their WTO obligations. GATT Article XXI provides exceptions on security
120. See KEY TO KIMBERLEY, supra note 85, at 1, 16.
121. DIAMOND HIGH COUNCIL, supra note 78.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. SUMMARY OF KPCS REVIEW, supra note 116 (follow "Review Visit: USA Summary" hyperlink).
125. Id.
WINTER 2006
958 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
grounds. 26 GATT Article XXI(b) allows for exceptions when such measures are neces-
sary to protect a Member State's "essential security interests" that relate to traffic in arms
and other goods related to the purpose of establishing a military establishment. Terrorism
threats justify invoking GAT Article XXI. 127 Al Qaeda has been involved in the smuggling
of conflict diamonds across borders and has profited from their sales. Thus, the war on
terrorism could possibly justify an import ban on conflict diamonds under GATT Article
XXI(b). Supporters of the waiver argue that there are no cases so far to offer such interpre-
tation and any future VTO panel rulings might not reach the same results.
Opponents also argue that countries might be able invoke GATT Article XXI(c). This
provision allows for security exceptions taken "in time of war or other emergency in inter-
national relations," or in "pursuance of... obligations under the United Nations Charter
for the maintenance of international peace and security."' It is unclear, however, whether
the provision of GAIT Article XXI(c) applies to actions based on U.N. Security Council
resolutions or covers General Assembly resolutions, as well.
In addition, the general exceptions in GATT Articles XX(a) and (b) might also apply.2 9
GAIT Article XX(a) applies to measures "necessary to protect 'public morals.' "130 Arguably,
this provision could apply to conflict diamonds because trade in blood diamonds finances
military activities and causes serious human rights violations. According to GAT Article
XX(b), measures are justified if necessary to "protect human ... animal or plant life or
health."'' It is important to stop the trade in conflict diamonds to save human life and stop
wars in Africa. Proponents of the waiver argue that conflict diamonds might not fall under
the public morals exception. There have not been any cases so far that justify the Kimberley
Certification measures under GATT Article XX(b).
The next step is to evaluate whether the measure falls within the chapeau of GAIT
Article XX. The chapeau requires that the "measures must not be applied 'in a manner
which woud constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where
the same conditions prevail"' or as a "disguised restriction on international trade."'32 Thus,
the panel has to determine whether the measure is discriminatory in its application, and
if so, whether there is an arbitrary or disguised discrimination. A measure does not con-
stitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination if all exporting countries have
a similar opportunity to negotiate an international agreement. The KPCS is open to all
interested countries, and the United Nations has recognized its appropriateness. " Restric-
tions against non-participants in the KPCS should not be seen as arbitrary and disguised
actions. The certification scheme applies to all conflict diamonds around the world, requires
Kimberley certificates from participating countries, and bans trade in diamonds from
126. See Joost Pauwelyn, WTO Compassion or Superiority Complex?: What to Make of the WTO Waiver for
"Conflict Diamonds," 24 MICH.J. INT'L L. 1177, 1186 (2003) (arguing that a WTO waiver was unnecessary).
127. See Peter Lindsay, Note, The Ambiguity of GATTArticle XX: Subtle Success or Rampant Failure, 52 DUKE
LJ. 1277, 1313 n.91 (2003) (arguing that the application of national security principles under GATT Article
XX remains contested).
128. Id.
129. See Chairman's Non-Paper, Kimberley Process Workshop on WTO Conformity (Feb. 15-17, 2002),
available at http://www.kimberleyprocess.com:8080/site/www docs/related_ docs 1/wto_conformitypaper.pdf
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non-participating countries. Lastly, opponents of the waiver state that the WTO waiver
could affect future trade restrictions imposed for humanitarian purposes that result without
any waiver.
Therefore, the KPCS falls as an exception under GATT Articles XXI or XX, and an
extension of the WTO waiver is unnecessary. Even if the WTO fails to extend the waiver,
participating countries could continue to enforce the KPCS measures against other partici-
pants in the process and ban any imports and exports from non-participants.
IV. Recommendations on How to Improve the Effectiveness
of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme
A. BROADEN THE SCOPE OF THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS
CERTIFICATION SCHEME
The KPCS should strive to increase its membership. It is crucial that non-participating
countries get involved because smuggling currently occurs mostly from non-participants.
It is also important that participants implement more rigid internal controls because smug-
gling also occurs from participants that have implemented weak controls. The certification
scheme should be expanded to include not only unpolished diamonds, but also polished
diamonds and jewelry. Rough diamonds are smuggled into a non-participating country or
a participant with weak internal controls, and go through a substantial transformation pro-
cess. From rough diamonds, they become transformed into jewelry, and then are exported
into a participating country. The jewelry is no longer banned even though it is made of
conflict diamonds. Polished diamonds should be verified through their country of origin.
In addition, KPCS participating countries should share manuals that list in detail the char-
acteristics of diamonds from every diamond-producing nation to be shared by all partici-
pants. Belgium should share with KPCS participants the Diamond Office's illustrated atlas
describing the characteristics of diamonds from Africa and methods to recognize them.
That way, customs officials would be able to examine whether the diamonds come from the
country of origin stated on the certificate and whether they are blood diamonds. The KPCS
should not be a process only existing on paper. It should require uniformity of verification
and border control, and accurate statistics.
B. STRENGTHEN VERIFICATION AND BORDER CONTROL IN
THE UNITED STATES
The United States has much to learn from Belgium in terms of verification and border
control. The Clean Diamond Trade Act does not require the U.S. Kimberley Process
Authority to examine the contents of parcels for export.3 4 Diamonds exported from the
United States are only randomly physically inspected by CBP. Few parcels are opened on
imports and almost none on exports.'35 The infrequent examination of diamond parcels in
the United States facilitates diamond smuggling. The United States should check all the
relevant documents, issued import and export licenses, and certificates of origin of diamonds
134. See Clean Diamond Trade Act, supra note 49.
135. See KEY TO KIMBERLEY, supra note 85.
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coming from non-participating countries such as Mali. All diamonds should be examined
and cleared at the ports of entry before entering the territory of the United States. The CBP
officers should complete the clearance formalities, verify the supplied information, check
the documents that accompany the parcels, and verify the actual weight and value of the
diamonds.
The CBP officials should regularly examine the diamonds entering and leaving the
United States to ensure that the description in the Kimberley certificate matches the con-
tents of the diamond boxes and those diamonds do not come from non-participants. The
U.S. Kimberley certificates should also include the country of origin. CBP officials should
have handy an illustrated atlas describing the characteristics of diamonds from Africa and
methods to recognize them. CBP officers should verify the authenticity of the certificates
of origin and should contact the authorities in Ivory Coast to verify the authenticity of the
certificates. Carefully maintained statistics are equally important as they allow one to evalu-
ate import and export trends and to detect the path of illegal smuggling.
C. MAINTAIN ACCURATE STATISTICS IN THE UNITED STATES
Accurate data is crucial to detecting indirect imports and the smuggling of conflict dia-
monds, and the United States should maintain such statistics. The figures of diamonds that
are imported and exported to the United States would make it easier to detect any abnor-
malities and any increase of imports or exports from certain countries.
Similar to the Belgian FPSE, the United States could maintain accurate data on every
import and export of diamonds. The United States should update its statistics and reports
monthly. Those statistics should include data about the classification, weight, value, prov-
enance, origin, and destination of diamonds. This information should be checked against
the declarations submitted annually by diamond traders and manufacturers. Such reforms
would ensure that statistical reports are reliable and reflect the exact numbers of imports
and exports of diamonds.
V. Conclusion
The smuggling of diamonds from Ivory Coast to Mali and Guinea continues in spite
of the December 2005 ban by the United Nations Security Council. This calls into doubt
the efficiency of the KPCS. The KPCS only sets minimum standards and has limitations.
Its definition of conflict diamonds excludes polished diamonds and jewelry. KPCS partici-
pants have failed to establish uniform and reliable internal controls. The United States has
neither implemented regular verifications of diamond imports and exports nor maintained
accurate statistics. The United States has much to learn from Belgium. The United States
should strengthen its internal controls to halt the smuggling of diamonds through its ter-
ritory and should maintain accurate statistics. A strict implementation of the KPCS by the
United States, which is among the largest importing centers of diamonds in the world,
would contribute to less human rights abuses and tension in Ivory Coast and the rest of
Africa.
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